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ABSTRACT 
Two things in the past decade have raised our interest in interest rate 
derivatives (IRD) in Asia-Pacific region. They are: (1) growing demand in ERDs in 
terms of the increase of trading volume in both the exchange-traded and OTC 
activities; and (2) the liberalization and deregulation of financial system in Asia-Pacific 
region. 
From our study, we can see that there will also be a large demand in IRDs in 
Asia-Pacific region because the region has undergone some important steps in financial 
reform which will integrate the region with the rest of the world. This international 
financial integration amplifies the importance ofinterest rate, in turn, IRDs. 
We have divided our study into three main parts. First, we describe the roles 
of interest rate in the economy. Then, we present some determinants of interest rate. 
Next, we talk about the interest rate risk and volatility, with some description about 
the development of IRDs. Second, we give a brief account of macroeconomic 
development in Asia-Pacific region emphasizing on the rationale behind financial 
reform and the effect offinancial reform on the economy. Third, we discuss the need 
o f IRD and comment on the future development o f IRD in the region. 
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CHAPTER I 
• R O D U C T I O N 
Asia has already been widely recognized as the economic dynamo of the world 
in the Year 2000. The increasing dollar amount of export, the surging wealth 
accumulation and the demand for capital for infrastructure establishment, have already 
present enormous investment opportunities in the region than anywhere else in the 
world. International corporations are shifting their manufacturing base from their 
home countries to Asia in order to take advantage of the relatively lower effective tax 
rate and production cost. Following the industrial liberalization, financial liberalization 
is chasing tightly behind. A number of governments, like Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Korea and even Japan and China have already set up plans to liberalize their financial 
markets so as to facilitate the economic development of their countries. In terms of 
financial reform, interest rate and exchange rate liberalization are the main focuses. 
However, it is not difficult to see that most of the developing countries in Asia are 
trying to peg their exchange rate with US dollar because US is their dominant export 
market. Therefore, this may slow down the development for currency financial 
products a bit. On the contrary, the interest rate financial products are going to take 
the lead in the financial product development. It is well evidenced that the demand for 
interest rate related financial products have already surpassed those of currencies and 
equities. Therefore, the development potential for interest rate products or we will 
call it interest rate derivatives (IRDs) in the rest of the paper, seems unlimited in Asia. 
However, the economic development of Asia countries are not as smooth and simple 
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as it looks like. Besides fundamental demand, the synchronized legal and accounting 
infrastructures are essential to a healthy development of an efficient financial market. 
Unfortunately, development in these areas requires a strong government commitment 
which is far from clear in Asia. 
In this project, we are going to investigate the future development ofnU)s in 
the Asia Pacific region. At the very beginning of the paper, we are going to discuss 
the economics and significance of interest rate in a financial market and the recent 
trend of IRDs in other well established markets to get some ideas about where the 
development o f IRDs is pointing at. Afterward, we are going to find out the potential 
forces driving the demand ofIRDs. Here, we separate our analysis into two parts: In 
the first part, we shall discuss how the economic or financial reform in Asian countries 
introduce volatility in the market which is widely believed as the major driving force 
for the development ofIRDs. In the second part, a detail analysis of the economics of 
IRDs will be presented showing other factors, like agency cost reduction, tax effect, 
etc., are critical to the development of IRDs in Asia Pacific Region. Finally, we are 
going to review the practitioners' opinions on the future development of IRDs in the 
region after several IRDs related debacles and come up with a view on the IRD's 
fbture in Asia. 
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CHAPTER I I 
PERSPECTIVES OF ESfTEREST RATE 
Interest Rate and Capital Market 
Trade-offbetween Current and Future Consumption 
The importance of interest rate in capital market can be illustrated by applying 
the classical economic theories in a simple two-period economy. The discussion 
should begin with the individual choice of consumption. Suppose there is only one 
commodity in this simple economy. The individual has the preference of choosing 
between present consumption and future consumption. The scenario can be illustrated 
by a set of so called utility curves, indifference curves. Figure 1 shows one of the 
indifference curves. Along the curve, an individual is indifference with regard to 
current and future consumption. The individual could choose to consume Co now and 
Ci in the future. In order to consume more now, he has to forgo some consumption 
power in the future and vice versa. The curve clearly depicts the individual's trade off 
between present and future consumption. As the trade ofFis done between two points 
in time, it reflects the individual's time preference in consumption. 
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FIGURE 1 
I N D I V I D U A L CHOICE OF CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION 
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Next, assume the individual can produce the commodity for his own use but 
cannot exchange it for something else now or in the future. The production 
opportunity set is presented in Figure 1. Again, the concave curve depicts the trade 
off between the possible consumption now and future. The individual may have 
nothing to consume in the future i fhe consumes all current endowment and has left no 
input for production. Otherwise, he may have some outputs in next period as long as 
he forgoes some current consumption and put it into investment. Hence, the 
production opportunity set illustrates the possible combinations of present and future 
consumption as well as present and future production capacity. 
An Economy without Exchange 
For an economy without capital market, i.e., no opportunities to exchange, the 
utility curve would tangent the production opportunity set at point C*. At equilibrium, 
the individual would maximize his utility and utilize all outputs simultaneously by 
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consuming Co* now and CT in the future. More specific, the individual would 
consume Co* and withhold Po - Co* for investment. As a result, he would receive a 
consumption power o f CT in the future. I f a straight line (mm) which is tangent to 
point C* is drawn，the slope of the line shows the individual's preference towards 
consumption today and consumption tomorrow. From now on，the conceptual idea o f 
interest rate has been formulated. However, the importance and function o f interest 
rate in an economy is not yet been shown. It is necessary to look at an economy with 
capital market, exchange, to find out its importance. 
An Economy with Capital Market 
By definition, an individual could enjoy a higher satisfaction by choosing an 
upward or rightward indifference curve. It is because the total consumption, 
combining current and future, is greater. However, as we would see in Figure 2，the 
indifference curve would depart from the production opportunity set. The gap 
between these two curves represent the discrepancy between desired level of 
consumption and possible level of production. 
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FIGURE2 
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In order to close the gap, a market with exchange opportunities is formed. 
Suppose that the market exchange opportunity is depicted by the straight line (mm) in 
Figure 2. The slope of this line shows the exchange ratio between present and future 
consumption. That is the amount of additional consumption obtained from sacrificing 
one unit of current consumption. I f the ratio equals to one, it means that the amount 
of consumption sacrificed today could generate the same amount of consumption in 
the future. However, i f the ratio is greater than one, i.e., 1 + r where r is positive, the 
market or time preference is favour to consume in the future rather than present and 
vice versa. Hence, r represents the rate of interest for giving up of current 
consumption for future consumption. 
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At equilibrium, the market exchange opportunity (market line) would tangent 
to both indifference curve and production opportunity set at C' and P respectively. 
Assume the economy has an initial endowment Eo and future endowment Ei (i.e., at 
point E). The individual would consume Co now and Ci in the future in order to 
maximize his utility. Thus, he would have a saving of Eo - Co today. On the other 
hand, the individual would utilize the optimal production capacity by consuming Po 
and investing Eo - Po today. In return, he would obtain Pi in the future. As the net 
investment would be Eo - Po but the individual has only got Eo - Co, he needs to 
borrow Co - Po from the market at the rate of 1 + r. Then, he could maximize his 
satisfaction and utilize the optimum production opportunity. The above discussion 
clearly illustrates: 
• how interest rate relates to the time preference or individual choice of consumption 
between now and future; 
• how the existence of interest rate closes the gap between desired level of 
consumption and production opportunity; and 
• how individual could be better off, in terms of satisfaction, total production and 
total consumption, by engaging in market exchange activities (i.e., lending and 
borrowing activities). 
Determinants ofInterest Rate 
In addition to the three important issues illustrated, the above discussion also 
addressed to three other phenomena concerning interest rate. 
• Interest rate is a mean to link lenders and borrowers in the capital market together. 
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• Interest rate represents the time preference of consuming today or in the future. Is 
there any relationship between the time horizon and the level ofinterest rate? 
• The market exchange ratio (interest rate) was said to be predetermined. How 
would the ratio be determined? 
After knowing the role played by interest rate in capital market, it is time to 
discuss the relationship between interest rate and the above three phenomena. 
Credit Considerations 
The fundamental participants of capital market are lenders and borrowers. 
Financial intermediaries are served as middlemen to bring them together. As lenders 
are sacrificing their current consumption power in exchange with future consumption 
power, it is quite understandable that the borrowers' ability to repay the principal as 
well as interest in due course is vital to lenders. Lenders always face the risk of default 
by borrowers. Hence, in determining interest rate, lenders would most likely take into 
account the credit worthiness of the debtors.i Figure 3 shows clearly that lower credit 
rated bonds offers higher promised yields, interest rates, than bonds with higher credit 
rating.2 The "additional premium" is known as quality spread or credit spread. It is 
used to compensate lenders for the high default risk they are facing. 
1 Kern, David, and Peter Gutmann, Interest Rate Analysis and Forecasting, Woodhead-Faulkner, 
1992, p.40. 
2 The annual yields are the average of the monthly averages as reported in Moody's Bond Record. 
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FIGURE 3 
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Hall(1993), p . m . 
Term Structure 
Besides the differences in creditability of borrowers, interest rates also vary 
according to different terms to maturities. Currently, there are three dominant theories 
explaining the phenomenon. 
The pure expectations theory was introduced by Irving Fisher and further 
developed by Friedrich Lutz. In broad terms, the theory states that the expected one-
period rate of return on investment is the same, regardless of the maturity of security 
in which one invests.^ In addition, the long-term interest rate is an "average" of future 
3 Van Horne, James C., Financial Market Rates and Flows, Forth Edition, Prentice Hall, 1994, p.92. 
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short-term interest rates. In a market with complete certainty, this implies that the 
expectation of future short-term interest rates would alter long-term interest rates. In 
this case, an expectation to increasing future short-term interest rates would drive up 
the long-term interest rates and vice versa. 
The risk neutral arbitrageurs ensure the equilibrium of the capital market. 
However, the pure expectations theory is not a complete theory because it requires 
market certainty. In fact, there are risks in reality and investors are risk averse. The 
longer the investment horizon the higher the uncertainty is. Credit or default risk 
discussed above is one of the examples. Therefore, lenders are more willing to lend in 
short term so as to maintain a certain level of liquidity. In contrast, borrowers are 
more eager to borrow in long term as the known financing costs. In order to attract 
more long term flmds and compensate lender to lend long, a liquidity premium is 
added to the long term interest rate. 
The pure expectations theory together with liquidity theory explain the 
appearance of normal upward sloping yield curve. Again, the reality is not so perfect. 
As suggested by Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch, different categories of lenders 
have different preferred habitats.^ Therefore, the market is actually divided into 
different segments according to maturities. Demand and supply determine the rate of 
interest in each segment. Now, a more complete picture has been drawn. In short， 
interest rate can be vary in short term to maturity as well as long term to maturity. 
4 Modigliani, Franco and Richard C. Sutch, “Innovations in Inlerest Rate Policy," American 
Economic Review, LV1 (May 1966) 178-197. 
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Loanable Funds 
I f the market segmentation theory holds, then the supply and demand of 
loanable funds would determine the rate of interest in each term to maturity. In 
specific, the supply of loanable funds is determined by the level of savings in the 
economy. Basic economic factors such as current and expected personal wealth, 
income, and sociological attitudes influence individual's attitude towards saving. On 
the other hand, the demand for loanable funds is determined by the actual and 
prospective productivity of capital and the borrowing requirements necessary to close 
the gap between the level of desired capital investment and existing resources.^ 
The rate of interest is both determined by the supply of savings, as well as 
helping to determine it. At the same time, the supply of savings and demand of 
loanable funds work together to determine the rate of interest in return. As the 
relationships between these three items are interrelated and so complex, the movement 
ofinterest rate is hard to be predicted. 
Interest Rate Risk 
In fact, many scholars try very hard to build up models to forecast interest rate 
movement or specifically to forecast the shape of yield curve. The basic models to 
5 Kern, David and Peter Gutmann, Interest Rate Analysis and Forecasting, Woodhead-Faulkner, 
1992, p.2. 
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forecast short term interest rate changes incorporate the concepts of normal diffusion 
or lognormal diffusion. However, they are not realistic because they do not take the 
characteristic of mean reversion into account and allow the model to general negative 
interest rates or let the rate to grow without limit over time. Thus, scholars such as 
Vasicek, Cox, Ingersoll, Ross, Black, Hull, White, Ho and Lee, developed several 
models to cope with this problem.^ Unfortunately, none of them can generate a term 
structure of interest rates that match the actual term structure in the market. 
It is the difficulty to forecast interest rate movement that brings the risk. 
Specifically, interest rate risk occurs when interest rate movements create uncertainty 
regarding the future cash flows or relating to the value of financial assets and liabilities 
of a corporation7 In other words, interest rate risk is the variation ofpossible returns 
that may be earned on a financial transaction due to changes in interest rates. It is also 
the risk that the institution's future earnings and market value will be altered due to 
changes in the levels of interest rates.^ In short, interest rate risk affects our future 
cash flows and market value of our financial assets and liabilities as well. 
6 Normal diffusion model: dr = p. dt + a dz and lognormal diffusion model: dr = p. r dt + a dz are 
simple one factor models that allow interest rate to grow without limit over time. Other 
models has incorporated mean reversion that causes the interest rate to move toward a long 
run value 0 over lime. Vasicek model: dr = a(9 - r) dt + a dz, Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model: dr 
=a(9 - r) dt + a Vr dz, and Ho-Lee model: dr = 9(t) dt + a dz are examples of this kind of 
one factor model, (where r is instantaneous short rate, a is volatility, 9 is long term mean 
for short rate, a is rate of mean reversion, dt is infmitesimal period of time, and dz is 
Brownian motion) In addition, there are multifactor interest rate models such as Brennan 
and Schwartz model and Heath-Jarrow-Morton model designed to deal with the twisting of 
yield curve. 
7 Andersen, Torben Juul, and Rikky Hasan, Interest Rate Risk Management, IFR, 1990, p.9. 
8 Payant, W. Randall, "Understanding Interest Rate Risk," Bank Management (June 1992) pp.70-72. 
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TABLE 1 
ILLUSTRATION OF INTEREST RATE RISK 
(A HYPOTHETICAL COMPANY) 
Interest Rate Scenario .10% .1.1% 
Floating Rate Loan $ 10 million $ 10 million 
Gross Profit $5.0 million $5.0 million 
Expenses (excludes interest) 3.0 million 3.0 million 
Interest Expenses 1.0 million 1.1 million 
Net Income $l .Omillion $0.9 million 
From the cash flow perspective, changes in interest rate have impacts on the 
amount of interest to be paid or received. This changes will eventually affect the 
income. Some selected financial information of a hypothetical company is presented in 
Table 1. As shown from the table, a 100 basis points or one percent increase in 
interest rate reduces net income by $0.1 million or 10 percent! 
Apart from cash flows, market values of both assets and liabilities can be 
altered by exposing to interest rate. Basically, there are two categories of risk factors 
embedded on balance sheet as shown in Table 2. The first category is liquidity 
mismatch or maturity mismatch. Liquidity mismatch means the maturities or 
durations^ between assets and liabilities are different. For example, a financial 
9 Duration is a concept first introduced by Frederick Macaiilay in 1938 to measure the average time 
that a bond investment is outstanding. Here, we take all assets as a series of cash inflows 
and all liabilities as a series of cash outflows. Thus, the duration of the asset or liabilities is 
the weighted average outstanding lime of the cash flows where the weighted is the present 
value of lhe cash flow (i.e., discount the cash flow by market interest rate). 
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institution extends a $5 million, 8 percent, 20-year fixed rate home mortgage to its 
customer by issuing 90-day certificates of deposit at 6 percent. The CDs have to 
renew at a higher rate i f the market interest rate increases substantially in the 90 days. 
Since the interest rate of the mortgage is fix, the market value of this mortgage will 
drop in response to the increasing market interest rate. As a result, the original 200 
basis points profit will be squeezed out. Of course, the institution may gain more by 
the widening of interest rate spread i f the market interest rate goes in another 
direction. 
TABLE 2 
RISK FACTORS EMBEDDED ON BALANCE SHEET 
Liquidity Mismatch 
Assets Liabilities 
Type One Short-term Long-term 
Type Two Long-term Short-term 
Interest Rate Mismatch 
Assets Liabilities 
Type Three Floating-rate Fixed-rate 
Type Four Fixed-rate Floating-rate 
Even the maturities between assets and liabilities have been set to equal, 
company may still expose to another kind of interest rate risk. It is caused by interest 
rate mismatch. The following example is an illustration ofinterest rate mismatch. 
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Assume the 6-month LIBOR, benchmark market interest rate, is 5 percent 
currently. A triple A rated company invests $10 million in a 10-year corporate bond 
with a coupon rate of 6 percent. This investment is financed by drawing down a $10 
million 10-year bank loan. Interest is paid semi-annually. The bank charges a floating 
rate of L IBOR plus 100 basis points and resets the rate every six-month. I f L IBOR 
increases from five percent to six percent half year later, the company will suffer a net 
interest loss of$0.5 million at that moment. In addition to the extra interest payment, 
the market value of the investment also declines 7.16 percent from $10 million to 
$9.84 million injust halfyear^o. 
Interest rate risk has great impact on the market value of financial assets and 
liabilities as well as cash flows. Hence, it is essential to develop tools or systems to 
management this risk especially in the period when the interest rate movement is 
turbulent. 
Interest Rate Volatility 
The unpredictability of interest rate movement creates risk. Thus, high interest 
rate risk is associated with turbulent interest rate movement. The following section is 
a revision of the historical movement of interest rate. It is aimed at obtaining a rough 
idea on how high interest rate risk was during the past two decades. 
,。 ^19 1 0 x ( 5 % - 2 ) 10 
10 Market value of the investment = (2 . „ ^ , (1 + 50/0 + 2 ) " + ( l + 6 % ^ 2 ) ' ^ )⑴；^". 
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Interest rates were considered to be more stable in early days than in the 
1980s," It was due to the shift in Federal Reserve's policy. Before fall o f 1979，the 
Federal Reserve was given the authority to set ceiling rates on time deposits. 
Regulation Q was enforced to regulate time deposit ratesJ^ The Federal Reserve's 
policy was to control bank reserves by controlling the fed funds rate. They set the 
target levels for the rate and only allowed it to vary within a predetermined narrow 
range. Thus, interest rates were not highly volatile.B 
This policy was abandoned on October 6, 1979. Instead of controlling fed 
funds rate, the new policy was aimed at controlling the level of bank reserves directly 
and letting the interest rates move freely. As a result, interest rate volatility increased 
dramatically and the corporate demand for interest rate risk management instruments 
was huge.i4 Figure 3 illustrates the movement of fed funds rate after the policy has 
been changed. The average level and variability of three key interest rates during the 
period from 1970 to 1992 are shown in Table 3. It can be seen that the shift in policy 
almost doubles the level of these key interest rates in early 1980s. The new policy also 
increased the interest rate volatility in terms of standard deviation. 
11 Shaffer, Sherrill, "Interest Rate Risk: What's a Bank to Do?" Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia (May/June 1991) p.l8. 
12 Broaddus, Alfred, "Financial Innovation in the United States - Background, Current Status, and 
Prospects’” Financial Institutions and Markets in a Changing World. Business Publications, 
Third Edition, 1987, p.607. 
13 Jirkovsky, Alan G., “The Money Markets," Handbook of Modern Finance’ Boston: Warren 
Gorham Lamont (1994) p.A3-34. 
14 Brown, Keith C., and Donald J. Smith, “Recent Innovations in Interest Rate Risk Management and 
the Reintermediation of Commercial Banking," Financial Management (Winter 1988) p.46. 
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Figure 4 together with Table 3 show that the key interest rates have dropped 
recently in terms of absolute value and variability. They have back to the similar level 
in the 1970s. This is because the Federal Reserve shifts its policy again. Currently, 
the policy put more emphasis on interest rate stability. 
FIGURJE4 
WEEKLY EFFECTIVE FED FUNDS RATE (1979-NOVEMBER 1992) 
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Source: Jirkovsky, Alan G., "The Money Markets," Handbook of Modern 
Finance’ Boston: Warren Gorham Lamont, Third Edition (1994), p.A3-35. 
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TABLE 3 
rNTEREST RATE FLUCTUATION 
(AVERAGE WEEKLY RATES W U.S.) 
Standard 
^ Low Average Deviation 
1970-Qctober 1979 
Fed Funds 13.55% 3.18% 6.94% 2.35% 
90-day CDs 12.66% 3.54% 7.11% 2.19% 
~Pr\me Rate 13.50% 4.63% 7.90% 2 . 0 9 % — 
October 1979 - 1982 
" iedFunds 20.06% 8.42o/o 13.27% 3.44% 
90-day CDs 20.58% 8.15% 13.07% 3.27% 
Prime Rate 21.50% — 10.50% 15.48% 3.26% — 
1983 - May 1988 
l^ed Funds 11.77% 5.71Q/o 7.86% 1.57% 
90-day CDs 11.75% 5.49% 7.85% 1.63% 
Prime Rate 13.00% 7.5Qo/o 9.53% 1.63o/o 
June 1988 - October 1992 
T e d Funds 10.01% 2.95% 6.97% 2.08% — 
90-day CDs 10.26% 3.07% 7.01% 2.05% 
Prime Rate 11.50% 6.0Qo/o 9.11% 1.65% 
Source: Jirkovsdy, Alan G., "The Money Markets," Handbook of Modern 
Finance, Warren Gorham Lamont, 1994, p.A3-36. 
Figure 5 is another illustration to show the movement of other key interest 
rates. We should note that not only U.S. interest rates but also LIBORs are becoming 
more stable now than the late 1970s. It can be partly explained by the abandon of 
Bretton Woods agreement'^ in early 1970s. After the broken down ofBretton Woods 
15 Bretton Woods system is a fixed exchange rate regime established at the end of World War II in 
1944. Currencies were pegged against the U.S. dollar which was convertible into gold. The 
broken up ofthis system was due to the widening ofU.S. balance of payment deficit in early 
1970s together with other economic shocks. 
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system, major currencies are free to float against U.S. dollar. Therefore, the impact on 
policy changes in one economy can rapidly transmit across economies directly or 
indirectly through the floating exchange rate system and interest rate parity 
mechanism. 
FIGURE5 
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Source: Cavalla, Nick, OTC Markets in Derivative Instruments, Macmillan, 
1993, p.3. 
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CHAPTER I I I 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES 
The Emergence ofDerivatives Markets 
The evolution of financial derivatives is highly related to the fundamental 
changes that have occurred in the financial markets . l6 These changes include the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the shift in monetary policy, the development 
of capital markets and credit markets.^ Besides, government tax policy and 
regulations, innovations in financial theory, and information and computer technology 
advancement have contributed to the growth and widely spread of derivatives usage. 
For example, the first exchange traded financial derivatives was introduced in 1972 by 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The product was designed to hedge against 
adverse exchange rate movements after the broken up of the Bretton Woods system. 
At least, there are four forces that contribute to the growth of derivatives 
m a r k e t . i 8 The first force is the sustained shifts and temporary surges in volatility of 
the underlying assets. The rise of exchange traded currency derivatives and interest 
rate derivatives in the 1970s are good examples. Secondly, the cash markets for 
government bonds and the growth of OTC derivatives foster a demand for liquidity. 
Many OTC derivatives dealers use exchange traded interest rate derivatives to hedge 
16 Sangha, Balvinder S., "Financial Derivatives: Applications and Policy Issues,” Business 
Economics (January 1995) p.46. ‘ 
17 Sangha, Balvinder S., "Financial Derivatives: Applications and Policy Issues," Business 
Economics (January 1995) p.46. 
18 Remolona, Eli M., "The Recent Growth of Financial Derivative Markets," Federal Reserve Bank 
ofNew York Quarterly Review (Winter 1992-93) pp.28-43. 
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their temporary positions and eventually boost the demand for exchange traded 
interest rate futures. In addition, both financial and nonfinancial corporations seek for 
innovative ways to handle interest rate risks. The demand causes the growth o f OTC 
interest rate derivative contracts, especially in swap contracts. The final force is the 
global diversification of institutional equity portfolios. I t leads to a demand for risk 
transferring OTC stock index options. 
Figure 6 shows a steady growth of financial derivatives on organized 
exchanges worldwide. The trading volume in the U.S. is almost the double of the sum 
of Europe and Japan market. A t the end of 1991，$336 million financial derivatives 
were traded and the U.S. was accounted for 54 percent of the value. Open interest in 
financial derivatives rose at an average of 36 percent a year from 1986 to 1991.i9 It 
reached $3,307.80 at the end of 1991 and the U.S. accounted for 6 0 . 6 p e r c e n t . 2 0 
Besides, the growth of financial derivatives in over-the-counter (OTC) markets was 
also remarkable. The growth in total notional principal was estimated at 40 percent 
per year from 1986 to 1991. The amount was estimated to be above $6 trill ion by the 
end o f l991.2 i 
19 Remolona，Eli M., "The Recent Growth of Financial Derivative Markets，” Federal Reserve Baiik 
ofNew York Quarterly Review (Winter 1992-93) p.28. 
20 Sundaram, Anant, "International Financial Markets," Handbook of Modern Finance, Boston: 
Warren Gorham Lamont (1994) p.F3-13. 
21 Remolona, Eli M., "The Recent Growth of Financial Derivative Markets," Federal Reserve Bank 
ofNew York Quarterly Review (Winter 1992-93) p.28. 
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FIGURE6 
FES[ANCIAL DERIVATIVES TRADED ON ORGANIZED EXCHANGES 
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Source: Sundaram, Anant, "International Financial Markets," Handbook of 
Modern Finance. Boston: Warren Gorham Lamont (1994) p.F3-13. 
At the end of 1992, interest rate derivatives dominated the world's financial 
derivatives m a r k e t . 2 2 It accounted for 63 percent of the market as shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 8 presents that interest rate swaps were the most commonly traded instrument 
among the four interest rate derivatives instruments. This was congruent to the survey 
findings from Wharton School. In 1994, Wharton School conducted a survey on U.S. 
non-financial firms. They found that swaps were the dominant vehicle in managing 
interest rate risk. In addition to interest rate derivatives, forwards were the most 
actively trade currency derivatives.^^ 
22 Sangha, Balvinder S., "Financial Derivatives: Applications and Policy Issues," Business 
Economics (January 1995) p.48. 
23 Bodnar, Gordon M., Gregory S. Hayt, Richard C. Marston, and Charles W. Smithson, "Wharton 
Survey of Derivatives Usage by U.S. Non-Financial Firms," Financial Management 
(Summer 1995) pp.104-114. 
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FIGURE 7 
COMPOSITION OF GLOBAL PIGURE 8 
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Source: Sangha, Balvinder S., "Financial Derivatives: Applications and Policy 
Issues,” Business Economics (January 1995) p.48. 
Interest Rate Derivatives Market 
As per previous discussion, corporate faced a high interest rate risk period in 
the early 1980s. Financial institutions, which are skilled in risk management, then 
developed a series of derivative instruments to cope with the market demand. Figure 
9 shows that both exchange traded and OTC interest rate derivative instruments have 
remarkable growth in terms of outstanding notional principal over the past few years. 
The total amount grew seven-folds from 1986 to 1991. We should not be surprised by 
this findings when we refer to previous discussion (Remolona 1992). It is because 
three out of the four driving forces that contribute to the rapid growth of derivative 
markets are related to interest rate risk management. 
The Federal Reserve Board abandoned its early policy and allowed the interest 
rate to float freely in 1979. The increased interest rate volatility was then transmitted 
24 
to other countries through the floating exchange rate regime. It accelerated the 
development of interest rate derivative markets throughout other countries in the 
1980s. 
F IGURE9 
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Source: Sundaram, Anant, "International Financial Markets," Handbook of 
Modern Finance, Boston: Warren Gorham Lamont (1994) p.F3-15. 
Generally, there are four major streams of interest rate derivative instruments 
namely futures, options, swaps, and forward rate agreements (FRAs). The following 
section is going to review the developments of these instruments. 
Interest Rate Futures 
The first interest rate derivative instrument was introduced by Chicago Board 
of Trade (CBOT) in 1975. It was an interest rate futures on Government National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA) collateralized depository receipts contract.^^ One 
24 Sundaram, Anant, ''International Financial Markets," Handbook of Modern Finance, Boston: 
Warren Gorham Lamonl (1994) p.F3-15. 
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year later, the International Monetary Market ( IMM) introduced a three-month U.S. 
Treasury bill contract. It was the first fbtures contract based on short-term interest 
rates. Since then, especially during the 1980s, over 50 futures and options exchanges 
have opened worldwide. 
Three-month Eurodollar time deposit futures started trading in 1981. Later 
on, the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) commenced 
business in 1982. LIFFE was focusing on sterling interest rate contracts and contracts 
based on the Eurodeposit market. The CBOT introduced its 30-day interest rate 
futures contract in 1989, while the CME introduced a one-month LIBOR futures 
contract in 1990.25 As of 1991, the notional principal value of interest rate futures 
was over $2 trillion.26 
Interest Options 
The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), the first registered option 
exchange in the U.S., commenced business in April 1973.27 j t standardized the option 
contracts and set up clearing facilities. Since then, several exchanges developed stock 
option contracts on major stocks and started to trade on individual exchange. Most of 
the non-equity options were developed in 1980s. It was 1982 when the Montreal 
25 Kuprianov, Anatoli, “Money Market Futures," Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Nov/Dec 1992, 
p.l9. 
26 Siindaram, Ananl, "International Financial Markets," Handbook of Modern Finance. Boston; 
Warren Gorham Lamont (1994) p.F3-15. 
27 Klemkosky, Robert C., "The 1980s: An Evolutionary Decade for the Financial System," Business 
Horizons CNovember-December 1989) pp.2-13. 
26 
Exchange (ME) introduced the first currency options contract. Later on, the options 
on Treasury securities and options on interest rate futures contracts were also 
developed. 
Although there are options on bonds and options on bond futures (futures 
options) in the market, futures options is the majority. It is because the settlement of 
futures options do not deal with accrued interest. Besides, the futures market is so 
liquid that there are plenty of supply of deliverable futures contracts in the market. In 
fact, futures options were developed in response to the success of interest rate futures 
contracts. 
Another type of options is on FRNs. This kind of options are OTC traded and 
include interest rate caps, floors and collars.^^ The market emerged in 1985 when a 
group of 20 large banks in the U.S. issued $2.75 billion ofFRNs.29 The issues were 
capped in order to control the corporate issuers' interest rate exposure at a maximum 
level. Meanwhile, the banks stripped these caps and sold them in the market so as to 
reduce borrowing costs. 
28 Under a cap option, the writer contracts to pay the buyer the interest differential O^ase on a 
notional principal) if the reference interest rate exceed the cap interest rate. Take the same 
token, the writer contracts to pay the buyer the interest differential if the reference interest 
rate turns out to be lower than the floor rate. A collar option combines both cap and floor in 
a single contract. It gives the buyer the protection from the reference interest rate going 
beyond the predetermined range. 
29 Sundaram, Anant, "International Financial Markets," Handbook of Modern Finance. Boston: 
Warren Gorham Lamont (1994) p.F3-17. 
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Besides the U.S. market, OTC options also experienced a rapid growth in 
other markets worldwide. Now, we have options contracts dominated in sterling, 
deutsche mark, and Japanese yen. 
Interest Rate Swaps 
Unlike the exchange traded derivatives discussed above, the swap market is 
unregulated. The market began by the introduction of a currency swap in 1981. The 
first interest rate swap emerged one year later. By the time of 1982, the estimated 
notional principal of global interest rate swap market was only $3 billion. However, 
the market grew rapidly from $100 billion in 1985 to above $500 billion in 1987 and 
exceeded $3 trillion in 1991,扣 
Interest rate swap is similar to a series of forward or futures contracts. 
Basically, it is a contractual agreement between two parties to "exchange" a stream of 
payments for a stated period. The fundamental interest rate swap is fixed/floating rate 
swap. The contractual party pays a stream of fixed interests to its counterparty in 
exchange for floating rate interests. The proper use of interest rate swap can not only 
transfer the interest rate risk from one party to another, but also lead to a win-win 
situation.3i 
30 Shaffer, Sherrill, "Interest Rate Risk: What's a Bank to Do?” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia Business Review (May/June 1991) p.17-27. 
Remolona, Eli M., ‘‘The Recent Grovvlh of Financial Derivative Markets," Federal Reserve Bank 
ofNew York Quarterly Review (Winter 1992-93) p.39. 
31 It is explained by lhe comparative advantage argument. The two "swap" partners may differ in 
credit ratings and have differeiU borrowing powers (i.e., they can borrow at different interest 
rates). If lhe higher rated party borrows in fixed interest rate from the market and engages 
28 
Definitely, the growth of interest rate swap market is not by chance. There are 
several reasons behind. The most widely accepted assertion is comparative advantage. 
Companies differ in borrowing power in terms of amount obtained and interest rate to 
be charged. It is due to the segmented financial market and asymmetric information. 
(Van Horne 1994) A party may borrow more effectively in fixed rate basis while the 
other party may have advantage in borrowing floating rate loans. I f both parties do 
not satisfy with the current terms, they can engage in a interest rate swap agreement. 
The swap agreement put these two parties together and the exchange of interest 
obligations can make them better of f by saving borrowing costs. Thus, more 
corporations were engaged in interest rate swap transactions in 1991 than in 1989 as 
shown in Figure 10. 
The incomplete financial market has given rise to the interest rate swap market 
boom. On the one hand, interest rate futures and futures options are limited in horizon 
to about five years. On the other hand, there are limited supply in the interest rate 
forward contracts. Firms, especially financial institutions, seek for new instruments 
that last for a longer period to hedge their duration mismatch. In general, the term of 
interest rate swaps can be extended to 15 years or even more.32 interest rate swaps 
products perfectly meet the institutions' requirements and fill up the spectrum to make 
in the interest rate swap agreement with the lower rated party who borrows in floating rate 
from the market, they can exploit the borrowing power differential and be better off by at 
lower interest rate. 
32 Van Horne, James C., Financial Market Rates and Flows’ Prentice Hall, 1994, Fourth Edition. 
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• official controls on bank interest rates or to market conventions maintained within 
each banking system. 
• capital controls separating the national markets from the Eurocurrency markets 
abroad. 
40 Marston, Richard C., International Financial Integration: A Study ofInterest Differentials Between 
the Ma or Industrial Countries. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.4-9 
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• differential in the expected nominal cost of financing in different Eurocurrencies 
• expected deviation ofinflation rates from purchasing power parity 
The first two factors together correspond to the domestic/Eurocurrency 
d i f f e r e n t i a H 、 T h e last two factors together correspond to the real interest differential 
between Eurocurrency rates^^ 
From the experience in G-5 c o u n t r i e s 4 3 , we can see that deregulation has 
succeeded in freeing interest rates on deposits. By the late 1980s, all five countries 
had established markets in certificates of deposit with rates tied closely to those in the 
money market. However, in loan market, the deregulation has not progressed as far as 
that of deposit markets. The gap between loan rates and money market rates remain 
large in most countries. This is partly because competing instruments like commercial 
paper have been slow in developing. Even if loan markets were competitive, however, 
posted loan rates might fail to measure the true cost ofbank financing. 
41 Frankel, Jeffrey, and Alan MacArlluir, "Political vs. Currency Premia in International Real 
Interest Rate Differentials: A Study of Forvvard Rates for 24 Countries," European Economic 
Review’ Vol.32, June 1988, pp. 1083-1114. 
42 Cumby, Robert, and Maurice Obstfeld, "International Interest Rate and Price Level Linkages under 
Flexible Exchange Rates: A Review of Recent Evidence," Exchange Rate Theory and 
Practice, ed John Bilson and Richard Marston, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 
pp. 121-51. 
43 Marston, Richard C., International Financial Integration: A Study of Interest Differentials Between 
the Ma or Industrial Countries, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.42. 
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Besides the freeing of interest rates, the removal of capital controls in G-5 
countries also help international financial integration^^. The national and 
Eurocurrency markets in each currency became effectively unified. Small differentials 
between national and Eurocurrency interest rates could still persist, whether due to 
reserve requirements or other factors. But by the early 1990s, the liberalization of 
capital flows had proceeded far enough that the distinction between national and 
international money markets, at least at the wholesale end, ceased to be important. 
From the experience in G-5 countries on the effect of deregulation on 
international financial integration, we can see that as countries in Asia-Pacific region 
move toward deregulated and liberalized financial systems, the demand o f IRDs in the 
region will increase. 
International financial integration would mean that IRD is becoming more 
important in two ways. First, interest rate will play a greater role in determining the 
demand and supply of capita! internationally. Second, the effectiveness of monetary 
policies in one countries will be affected by monetary policies in other countries. This 
may results in economic instability i f the central authorities cannot cope with this 
interdependence ofinterest rates. 
44 Marslon, Richard C., International Financial Integration: A Study of Interest Differentials Between 
the Ma or Industrial Countries, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995,. p.68-69. 
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Monetary Policy 
The structural changes in the financial system have affected (1) the linkage 
between monetary policy and the domestic economy, (2) the meaning of monetary 
aggregates, (3) the relative effectiveness of different monetary policy instmments^^. 
Financial liberalization in the Asian countries has had important implications 
for both the transmission mechanism and the operating procedures of monetary policy. 
Regarding the transmission mechanism, nonprice credit rationing was weakened while 
the role of market forces, notably interest rates, has become increasingly important in 
determining financial and credit flows. In addition, the relaxation of controls on 
international capital flows and the more toward more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements has increased the importance of the exchange rate as a channel for 
transmitting the effects of monetary policy. As a result, the monetary authorities' 
potential control over domestic monetary conditions has increased, but so has the need 
to coordinate monetary policy with exchange rate policy. 
The liberalization of interest rates has contributed to improving resource 
allocation, the mobilization of savings, and the efficiency ofinvestment. On the whole, 
these countries were not as affected by the destabilizing effects of excessively high real 
interest rates as were the three Southern Cone countries. In Indonesia and the 
Philippines, where high real interest rates persisted, countermeasures were 
45 This part is substantially from Tseng, Wanda and Robert Corker, “Financial Liberalization, Money 
Demand, and Monetary Policy in Asian Countries," Occasional Paper No. 84, International 
Monetary Fund, 1991, p.23-33. 
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implemented, but they complicated stabilization policies and slowed the financial 
liberalization process. 
Regarding the operating procedures of monetary policy, financial liberalization 
has affected both the setting of policy targets and the choice of instruments. In some 
of the countries, domestic credit targets were replaced by interest rates or monetary 
targets, while in others, several financial and economic indicators, including the 
exchange rate, are now employed. 
Many of these countries placed a greater emphasis on market-based monetary 
instruments rather than on direct controls on interest rates and credit. The reforms in 
the instruments of monetary policy have both permitted the deregulation of the 
financial system and have been supported by the development of markets and 
institutions in the liberalized environment. 
Most notable shift toward indirect monetary policy instruments has been the 
greater use of open market operations. At the same time, excessively high reserve 
requirements were lowered, and selective rediscounting was gradually replaced with 
generalized rediscounting. However, open market operations proved inadequate to 
stabilize monetary growth during periods of particularly severe disturbances. This 
reflected a variety of factors, including the inadequate development of markets and 
instruments for open market operations and the government's large domestic financing 
needs. Nevertheless, supported by measures to strengthen open market operations 
47 
and by progress made in reducing fiscal deficits, open market operations are evolving 
as an effective instrument of monetary policy in many Asian countries. 
These changes in monetary polices cast some doubts in whether the central 
authorities in Asia-Pacific region can really ensure the economic stability can be 
maintained. I f central authorities are not able to cope with these challenges, the 
economy will become volatile. In particular, the interest rate will be more volatile than 
before. Therefore, IRDs development should be in line with the macroeconomic 
development in the region in order to provide some tools to hedge the interest rate 
risk. 
48 
CHAPTER V I I 
THE D E M A N D AND SUPPLY OF ESfTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES 
Though financial reforms do bring in efficient financial markets which are 
essential to the future development of the region, the pain of transfomation is 
nevertheless inevitable. The discoordination between economic and financial reforms 
in different countries together with the competition for infrastructure investment funds 
do induce financial volatilities. However, the main question concerning the 
development of IRDs is whether the increasing interest rate volatility increase the 
demand for IRDs. I f they were, the demand for interest rate risk management tools 
and the interest rate volatility should be moving in tandem. However, it has been 
found that the volatility of interest rate has been decreasing since the mid 80s. It is 
possible to say that the volatility of interest rate was the major force driving the 
demand for IRDs at early 80s. However, the argument was not valid since 1984 
because the interest rate volatility was decreasing throughout the past decade to a level 
equivalent to the 1960s when there was minimal demand for IRDs. On the contrary, 
the trading volume of IRDs are stepping up significantly throughout the past decade, 
meaning that there are some other reasons other than interest rate volatility which 
stimulate the demand for IRDs. 
At the very beginning of this report, we have shown that the trading volume of 
interest rate derivatives have already been growing over the last ten years. Does this 
mean that using interest rate derivatives to manage interest rate risk can add value to 
organizations facing interest rate risks? Otherwise, there is no point for a company to 
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hedge. In this section, we are going to find out the driving forces of the growing 
trading volume and try to come up with a point of view on the future development of 
interest rate derivatives in Asia Pacific Region. 
Can Hedging Add Value to the Company? 
To answer this question, we have to revert back to the very basic concept of 
corporate finance, the discounted cash flow concept. Under this concept, the value of 
a firm is determined by the Net Present Value of the all the company's cash flows. The 
two most important elements in determining the NPV of a company are (1) the 
nominal cash flow and (2) the discount rate. This means that for the hedging strategy 
to be meaningful, it must be able to change both or at least one of these factors. 
Can Hedging Alter the Discount Rate of a Company? 
In the context of finance, the risk return trade-ofF is a very fundamental 
concept. Before the "invention" of CAPM^^ in 1964, however, even after that, 
corporate financiers used Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) to evaluate 
projects where the discount rates used in were not appropriate because of the 
ignorance of different risks involved in different projects. The appearance of CAPM 
builds up a linear relationship between risk and return. Although later Ross's critique^^ 
casted a question mark on the applicability of CAPM in the real world, the concept of 
46 Sharpe, W.F., "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market E uilibrium under Conditions of Risk," 
Journal ofFinance, September 1964, 425-442. 
47 Roll, R., "A Criti ue of lhe Capital Asset Pricing Theory's Tests," Journal ofFinancial Economics. 
March 1977, 129-176 
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risk-return justification has already been the corner stone for the development of 
finance theory in the recent twenty years. 
Ifhedging can reduce the discount rate of a company, it can reduce the overall 
risk level that the company is facing. It sounds reasonable to think this way and comes 
up with a conclusion that the popularity of IRDs is mainly due to the risk reduction 
function of those instruments. This is quite true i f there was no such a Portfolio 
Theory by H.M. Markowitz in 195248. The implication of portfolio theory is that the 
more assets we add to a particular portfolio, the lower the risk of the portfolio would 
be, provided that the risk profiles of those assets are not perfectly positively 
correlated. As more and more assets are added to the portfolio, it will only suffer 
from market risk. Since interest rate risk is diversifiable risks, the above argument is 
only valid i f assets are not diversified. I f this is the case, what is the point for the 
corporate financiers to hedge their risk at a cost as investors can do this on their own. 
In addition, investors that are influential to the markets are institutional investors, they 
have large and diversified portfolio, leaving small and undiversified investors with the 
need to hedge. Therefore, we can come up with a conclusion that hedging cannot 
lower the discount rate for large investors because of their internally diversified assets. 
From this onward, we can say that only those small investors can find hedging useful. 
I f the above mentioned logic is correct, the primary demand for derivatives must come 
from small investors which are, however, too small to boost up the whole derivative 
market. 
48 Markowitz, H.M., Portfolio Selection: EfTicient Diversification of Investment (Cowles Foundation 
Monograph 16). Yale University Press, New Haven, 1959. 
51 
I f hedging cannot reduce the discount rate or risk of a company, the potential 
benefit must come from cash flow enhancement. However, this possibility had already 
been ruled out by Modligliani and Miller in 1958^9 in their famous M M proposition I, 
stating that i f there is: 
(1) tax free; 
(2) no transaction cost; 
(3) fixed investment policy; and 
(4) minimal bankruptcy cost. 
The financial policy of a firm is irrelevant. According to MM's theory, 
hedging, as a financial policy, is irrelevant as well. As capital structure is irrelevant to 
the firm value, there is no point to hedge against interest rate risk. I f this was the case, 
there should be no market for IRDs. However, it has already been evidenced that 
trading volumes of IRDs in both exchange traded and OTC markets are rising 
annually. 
Fortunately, MM's theory is only valid under several stringent and unrealistic 
assumptions. It has already been well documented that financial policy does matter in 
determining the firm value in the presence of tax, transaction cost, bankruptcy cost and 
49 Modigliani, F., and M.H. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance, and the Theory of 
Investment," American Economic Review, June 1958, 261-297. 
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inconsistent investment policies. Now, we are going to see how the relaxation of 
MM's assumptions help boost up the demand for hedging^o. 
In MM's theory, we do not take into account the cost of financial distress or 
the bankruptcy cost. In the presence of these costs, a company needs to pay more to 
its stakeholders to compensate for a higher risk they bare. Under this situation, to 
reduce this kind of costs, firms have a higher incentives to manage their risks, which 
can reduce the opportunities of running into financial difficulties. 
For example, firms providing goods with warranties, like cars, machinery, etc. 
Customers would demand a lower price to compensate the risks they are taking i f they 
are going to buy goods from a company with fluctuating profit figures. In other 
words, this is the additional financial cost to the company. Moreover, i f a company is 
perceived to be in financial difficulty, it is likely to have higher staff turnover which is 
an implicit cost to the company. Suppliers who are sensitive to credibility of a 
company will reduce the credit limit or shorten the credit period to a company. This 
means the company may need to spare more funds for completing a transaction and 
hence increase the opportunity cost of that transaction. 
For the impact of tax policies on the demand ofhedging5i, it is found that: 
50 This part is substantiality taken from Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Charles W. Smithson and D. Skyes 
Wilford, Managing Financial Risk, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1990 
51 Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Charles W. Smithson and D. Skyes Wilford, Managing Financial Risk, 
Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1990 
53 
• The tax benefit ofhedging is a positive function of the volatility of pretax income. 
• The tax benefit of hedging is a positive function of the convexity of the tax 
schedule, where convexity means the marginal tax exceeds the average tax rate. 
Although Miller (1977)52 emphasizes the importance of the deductibility of 
interest in profits tax to account for the existence of an optimal capital mix, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)53 noted that firms issued debt long before corporate income taxes 
came into existence. Therefore, they proposed that there must be something more 
than tax advantage motivating management to hedge their financial risks. According 
to the basic corporate finance theory, the proper method of capital rationing is to 
evaluate and rank projects based on their NPV magnitudes when resources are scarce. 
However, it has been shown that this situation is true only i f the company is 
financed solely by equity. As the debt-equity ratio of a company grows, the 
management of the company tends to switch to projects with higher variability or 
reject positive NPV projects under certain circumstances. For the first case, it is pretty 
simple. Lets think about the case of a call option. The value of an option is greater i f 
the volatility of the underlying asset is higher because of the fixed amount of loss but 
relatively unlimited growth potential. The position of a shareholder is similar to that of 
an option buyer i f there is a debt element in the financial structure. Under this 
circumstance, the shareholder will share the positive growth of the company with 
52 Miller, M.H., “Debt and Taxes,” Journal oFFinance, May 1977, 261-275. 
53 Jcnsen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H., “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure,” Journal oFFinancial Economics, March 1976, 305-360 
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limited downside risk which has been taken up by the bondholder. In addition, under 
certain situations, it is more favourable for the management whose remuneration 
package depends on the satisfaction of the shareholder, to reject some positive NPV 
projects when there are debts in the financial structure. In Myers (1977)^4 it has been 
shown how a difference in firm value will influence management's decision on project 
evaluation and how hedging strategy can be used to rectify the problem. 
Originally, in the presence of these conflicts, bondholders tend to introduce 
bond convenants or other forms of restrictions to control the manipulation of 
management. However, to monitor the compliance of these convenants involves a lot 
of administrative works leading to bondholders charging a higher interest rate, these 
additional cost are known as the agency cost. However, in the paper Myer (1977)^^, it 
is found that financial hedge can reduce the agency cost through limiting the 
underinvestment decision in a company with debt in its financial structure. Therefore, 
the higher the debt-equity ratio of a company, the higher the value of hedging 
strategies to the company. It also follows that the greater the variability of projects 
available to a company, the greater the conflict between shareholders and bondholders 
will be and hence the higher the value ofhedging strategies. 
There are some other evidences confirming the economic value ofhedging. In 
“ A Framework for Risk Management" by Kenneth Froot, David Sharfstein and Jeremy 




Stein, 1994, it has been pointed out that firms should hedge to ensure sufficient cash 
f low to finance their investment projects. In addition, in "Rethinking Risk 
Management" by Rene Stulz, 1995, he reckons that firms with little leverage has no 
need to hedge as the risk of getting into financial difficulties is small while hedging 
have great economic value especially to those firms with high debt-equity ratio^^. 
Wall's (1989)57 pointed out that the self-control characteristics o f a company 
entering into a synthetic fixed rate financing will help it to lower the cost o f capital. It 
is because companies entering into synthetic fixed rate financing shouid expect its 
future credit quality to improve. Otherwise, the company wil l be in a very difficult 
position since it does not have the enough fund to pay for its floating interest as the 
credit spread increases once the credit quality deteriorates. Therefore, the synthetic 
fixed rate financing can be regarded as the control apparatus to reduce the motivation 
for shareholder to reap the bond holders of f and hence lowering the agency cost as 
well as the cost of financing. 
Flannery (1986)58 and Diamond (1991)59 focus on the signalling effect o f 
synthetic fixed rate financing caused by imperfect market information. Under 
imperfect market information, bondholders are unable to perfectly discriminate good 
56 "Corporate Risk Management," The Economist, Feb 10, 1996. 
57 Wall, Larry D., "Interest Rate Swaps in an Agency Theoretic Model with Uncertain Interest 
Rates," Journal ofBanking and Finance, voll3, May 1989, 261-70 
58 Flannery, Mark J., "Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice," The Journal of 
Finance, vol 41, March 1986, 393-414. 
59 Diamond, D.M., “Debt Maturity and Li uidity Risk," The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics. vol. 51, 
August 1991, 709-37. 
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quality borrowers and poor quality borrowers. Therefore, there are chances that 
investors overprice good quality borrowers. In order to avoid the unnecessary 
premium, good quality borrowers will borrow short term instead of long term in order 
avoid the excessive spread down the maturity schedule. Conversely, managers of 
firms with the knowledge of quality deterioration will tend to borrow long so as to 
avoid additional premium when the credit spread does deteriorate. Therefore, a good 
quality borrowers will borrow short until investors notice its quality and adjust their 
interest rates charge to them accordingly. The short coming of this strategy is that it 
will expose the company to unnecessary interest rate risk. To remedy the deficiency, 
the company will enter into a swap to convert the floating rate borrowing into fixed 
rate borrowing. Therefore, the hedging strategy is able to reduce the overall funding 
cost of the company. 
For any hedging, there must be a seller and a buyer. If someone wants to 
borrow floating and swap into fix, then there must be someone wants to borrow fix 
and swap into floating. Otherwise, the market will die out in a short period of time. 
Wall (1989)60 and Titman (1992)6i proposes that floating rate payers share the cost 
saved by the fixed rate payers to create a win-win situation for the market to carry on. 
Intermediaries can lower the cost charging for fix to floating swap because of the 
following reasons: 
(1) Smaller risk associated with swaps than with actual lending; 
60 Wall, Larry D., "Interest Rate Swaps in an Agency Theoretic Model with Uncertain Interest 
Rates," Journal oFBanking and Finance, voll3, May 1989, 261-70 
61 Titman, Sheridan., "Interest Rate Swaps and Corporate Financing Choices," Journal of Finance, 
vol 47，September 1992, 1503-16. 
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(2) Swaps are OTC instruments, only highly rated parties are involved; 
(3) A diversified swap portfolio has little risk of a large credit loss. 
The cost saved by intermediaries can motivate them to offer a better rate to 
swappers than to direct borrowers. Hence driving the market f b r w a r d . 6 2 
62 Kuprianov, Anatoli, "The Role of Interesl Rate Swaps in Corporate Finance," Federal Reserve 
Bank oFRichmond, Economic Quarterly, vol 80/3, Summer 1994. 
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CHAPTER V I I I 
THE ASIAN MARKET 
After establishing the economic value for hedging, we are now going to see 
what the market for IRDs in Asia is going to be. First of all, we are going to review 
the recent IRD market conditions and identify factors pushing the market forward. 
Secondly, as we have mentioned before, the higher the gearing ratio of a firm, the 
higher the value for the firm to hedge. Therefore, i f the debt market for Asia is going 
to get into shape, growing market demand for IRDs is the destiny. We are going to 
take a look at the financing needs of emerging markets in Asia as well as the pace of 
bond market development to determine the stage of development of Asia debt market. 
Finally, the potential impedance for the development of Asia debt market will be 
reviewed so as to give a fairjustification on the development of the IRDs in Asia. 
In this part, we are going to see how different types of interest rate derivatives 
grow, the growth ofIRD's usage in different geographic regions and finally the factors 
fuelling the growth.63 
As we have mentioned at the beginning of our study, there are two types of 
IRDs: Exchange traded and Over-the-counter. Exchange traded contracts are 
63 This part is drawn substantially from Remolona, Eli M., “The Recent Growth of Financial 
Derivative Markets," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review. Winter, 1992-
93. 
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contracts with standardized contract amount, specific maturity date, and cleared 
through an exchange. The important features of exchanged traded contracts, the 
standardization of contracts together with clearinghouse offset serves to limit 
transactions costs and thus fosters high degree of liquidity in exchange market. 
However, because of its standardization feature, most of the time, exchange traded 
contracts cannot meet specific requirements of different IRD users. Therefore, the 
establishment of OTC market is to cater for these customized needs. OTC markets 
trade customized swaps, options, and forward contracts without going through a 
clearinghouse. Since OTC contracts are highly customized, the liquidity of OTC 
markets are much lower than the cash market. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the 
existence of OTC market is to reconfigure the risk instead of providing liquidity. 
(Figure 11) 
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Exchange-traded and Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives 
^ 10 _>_J _ 
g Q Nolional principal ofover- ^^^^^ 
i Oie-coLinler derivatives ^^^^ 
I 8 — ^ 8 -
B Opcn inie^ isl ofexchangc- ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^ S^ 
^ 广 traded clerivalives ^^ ^^ ^¾ ^^ ^^ ^g 
I 6 — ™ - ^ H -
I 4 M " B " B ^ 
^ ^ m B ^ ^ B ^ ^ H 
5¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ ¾^¾¾¾¾¾¾¾ r$$$$^xPXMkA B888888888889 2  RKSS5SK2K51 VXCwCCGCvXA KSSSSSSfi$9621 
I 2 - • _ _ - ^ J " J " 
I 0 I ^ m I 圖 I 圖 I 圓 I ^ M I 圖 I 
86 87 88 89 90 91 
In both organized exchange and OTC markets. The growth in derivatives has 
been dominated by contracts based on interest rates. In exchange markets, turnover 
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interest rate contract grew 21 percent a year from 1986 to 1992 and accounted for 
90% of the absolute increase in total exchange market turnover (Figure 12). As in the 
exchange markets, most of the derivatives growth in the OTC market consisted of 
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The geographical growth financial derivatives manifested itself largely in the 
opening of new derivatives exchanges and the widening share of nondollar currencies 
in OTC derivatives. 
New Derivatives Exchanges 
The growth in the turnover of exchange-traded derivatives was concentrated in 
exchanges outside the United State, which most of them new. (Figure 14) Between 
1986 and 1992, a period when turnover on US derivatives exchanges was barely 
growing, turnover in European exchanges rose 47% a year and contributed the largest 
share of the growth in turnover worldwide. Turnover in exchanges in the Far East 
grew 29% a year during the period and contributed the next largest share of global 
turnover growth. The OTC markets operate internationally over telephone lines 
without a central clearinghouse to fix geographical locations. Transactions made in 
London may well be booked in Frankfurt. Nonetheless, the increasing importance of 
nondollar currencies in OTC contracts indicates the geographical diffijsion of these 
derivatives. The share of nondollar sector in interest rate swaps widened from 20% in 
1986 to 51% in 1991. The Japanese yen has been the most important nondollar 
currency; its share of interest rate swaps has doubled since 1987 to 16% in 1991. The 
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CHAPTER IX 
FORCES D R I V m G DERIVATIVES GROWTH 
Eli M. Remolona (1992)64 points out that there are at least four broad 
development giving rise to the surging demand of derivatives. 
(1) Sustained shifts and temporary surges in market volatility differentially affected 
the demands for the various derivatives; 
(2) The emergence of important cash market for government bonds and the 
growth of OTC derivatives fostered a demand for the liquidity provided by 
exchange-traded interest rate futures. 
(3) Interest rate risks faced by financial institutions and nonfinancial corporations 
created a demand for risk-transferring OTC interest rate contracts.; 
(4) The globally diversification of institutional equity portfolios led to a demand 
for risk-transferring OTC stock index options. 
The factors (1), (2) and (3) are the leading driving forces for an increasing 
demand ofinterest rate derivatives. 
64 Ibid. 
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Sustained Shifts in Volatility 
The timing of volatility-inducing shift in policy regimes helps explain why 
currency contracts reached the slow-growth stage so much earlier than interest rate 
contracts. In the FX market, the advent of floating exchange rate in 1973 ushered in a 
new era of volatility. In money and bond markets, the Federal Reserve's shift to 
targeting monetary aggregates rather than interest rates in October 1979 was the 
watershed event that lifted interest rate volatility to an unprecedented levels. Thus the 
currency contracts gained popularity first and now appear to have reached the slow-
growth stage of maturity, while the interest rate contracts are still gaining popularity 
and continuing to grow strongly in trading volumes. 
However, volatility surge may not necessarily be permanent. Does this mean 
that the trading volume will die out after the volatility decreases? Not exactly ！ 
Temporary surges in volatility often induce temporary surges in turnover. It is also 
possible that a temporary volatility surge can increase demand permanently by bringing 
new converts to the market. Dramatic political events in 1991 sharply increased 
turnover in equity index options at the European Option Exchange, SOFFEX, the 
MATIF and the Stockholm Options Exchange. (Figure 15) global turnover in equity 
index contracts grew 10 percent in 1991, but 4 percent growth in 1992 belies the 
possibility of a permanent increase in demand Similarly the currency turmoil of 
September 1992 produced record turnover in interest rate contracts At LIFFE, the 
MATIF, and DTB. (Figure 16) 
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Figure 15 
Impact of 1991 Events on 
Exchange-traded Derivatives 
1 8 0 0 ^ * T 
1 6 0 0 - - M ^ H|jjj^ll, I,_l|_ 
• ^ 4 0 0 - ^ ^ ¾ ^ ^ W / : ^ 
1 1 o n n / w ^ ^ ^ 一 國 ^ |4 '^.M ‘-''"。-
g I zuu- f ：； , � ^ ^ , : , ^ f ^ ^ g s ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ . . , ‘ M^u';) r?/-“>；‘ 
2 . n n n “‘‘ ' ^ l r ® T ^ ^ w ' ^ fe ^ ' “厂’ 
^ I UUU- ,” ,;i^  ‘ ^ "^, ^ vJnd^^^ns ^  '1|；^ • "n、 
I 8 0 0 - ^ ^ ^ ‘ ’ t s S M e t _ i ^ - ^ 
I 6 0 0 - _ _ _ ^ ^ : : ^ ! ^ i S ^ A 
I 4 0 0 - ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ > > ^ _ _ J ^ ^ ^ ? / " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
2 0 0 - CMX Options 
0 " 1 — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — 
9091 F M A M J J A S 〇 N D 
D J 
Figure 16 
Impact of Sept 92 Currency Turmoil 
on Exchange-traded Derivatives 
1 4 • Euromark Futures 
口 Short Sterling Futures 
1 2 嗣 Notional French Bond ^ 
Fut_ \ 
1 Q El Notional French Bond J ^ ^ ^ ^ K 
差 口 German Bund Futures ^ J ^ ^ w X 
1 : : ^ ^ ^ K 
2 - ^ j ^ ^ S " i M m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
0 ~l 1 I 1 r 1 1 1 1 1 1 
J F M A M J J A S 0 N D 
Moreover, although we have already shown at the very beginning of our report 
that the volatility ofinterest rate is actually decreasing in the past decade. However, it 
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may not necessarily be the case at all. The reason is that technology development and 
the worldwide integration of financial markets has already significantly reduced the 
time required for the transmission of a financial impact. Twenty years ago, a change in 
financial policy in one country may take days or weeks to transmit its effect to other 
markets. Nowadays, the transmission happens in seconds. Therefore, annual interest 
rate volatility is decreasing at the expense of daily or hourly interest rate volatility. 
Hence it is hard for corporate treasurers to predict what will happen in the next 
minutes and the best way is to hedge instead of predicting, giving additional spurs to 
the IRD markets. 
The demand for new ways to transfer interest rate risk 
Miller (1986), Ross (1989), Silber (1983) and Van Horne (1985) taken 
collectively suggest ten actors stimulating the financial innovation process.65 Among 
them, (1) Risk reallocation and (2) Volatility of interest rates are the two most 
dominant factors. Eli M. Remolona (1992)66 contends that demands by both financial 
and nonfinancial firms for new ways of dealing with interest rate movements help 
explain the huge expansion in interest rate swaps. OTC derivatives have served to 
provide new ways of transferring market risk. The rapid growth in OTC interest rate 
contracts, particularly swap contracts, may be attributed to financial institutions' and 
65 Finnerty, J.D., "Financial Engineering in Corporate Finance: An Overview," Financial 
Management, April 1988, 14-33. 
66 This part is drawn substantially from Remolona, Eli M., “The Recent Growth of Financial 
Derivative Markets," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Winter, 1992-
93. 
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nonfinancial corporations' desire to deal with interest rate risks in new ways. Financial 
institutions turned to these derivatives to replace traditional hedging operations 
executed in the cash market, while nonfinancial corporations, some facing increased 
leverage, turned to the derivatives for general hedging and positioning purpose rather 
than just for saving on borrowing costs. 
One of the most prominent IRDs is interest rate swaps. End-users swap 
activity grew as financial institutions started using swaps for their own risk 
management and positioning purposes. The increased importance of funds 
management from mid-1980s on and new regulatory capital standards later in the 
decade prompted many banks to turn to swaps as a way to deal with increased interest 
rate risks. 
Traditionally, financial institutions make profits from a loan in the following 
ways: They lend money out to borrowers and charge them a lending rate. At the 
same time, the bank will borrow money from the interbank market to fund the lending 
(assumed that there is no idle funds in the bank and the capital requirement within 
regulatory requirements). I f the bank satisfies with the spread between the borrow and 
lending rate with the same maturity, there is perfectly all right. All the risks faces by 
the bank is the settlement risk and the credit risk. However, lets assume that the yield 
curve is upward sloping, it makes sense for the bank to lend long term and borrow 
short term to reap the yield curve profit. This action will put the bank in an interest 
rate mismatch situation. The bank will need to rollover the short term borrowing to 
maintain the position. I f the yield curve remains upward sloping and there is no 
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repayment default, at the maturity of the loan, the bank will receive principal and 
interest from the borrower and close the position with interbank market. However, 
unfortunately, i f the short term interest rate rises sharply, the bank may lose money 
when the short term borrowing rate is higher than the long term lending rate. To 
avoid losing money, the bank needs to close the long term lending position and by 
borrowing money for the same maturity. 
This kind of activities is equivalent to adjusting the duration of the asset and 
liability in order to match them to minimize interest rate risk. However, changing the 
duration of the portfolio this way will require capital commitment because of the 
Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR) of financial institutions. Conversely, with the 
help of swap, the bank can manage its duration without actual borrowing and lending. 
It is because by changing a fixed rate asset into a floating asset will automatically 
reduce the duration of the asset since the duration of floating rate asset is smaller than 
the fixed rate asset. The Basle accord of 1989 requires a lower credit weighting for 
swaps. Hence an interbank swap would require only a small fraction of the capital 
required by an equivalent interbank cash position on the balance sheet. That's why in 
recent years, the interbank market has plunged, in part because banks now use the 
market narrowly for funding and use OTC derivatives for hedging (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17 
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For those nonfinancial firms, we have already shown the economic motivations 
for their use of financial hedges to manage their financial risks at the beginning of this 
section. 
The Demand for Liquidity 
Demands for liquidity help explain the strong growth of futures on both long-
term and short-term interest rate derivatives. Eli M. Remolona (1992)67 found that 
trading in the cash markets for French and German government bonds was relatively 
inactive when interest rate futures for these bonds were first introduced suggesting 
that these markets lacked liquidity at that time. The pent-up demand for liquidity in 
the new government bond markets helps explain the strong growth of exchange-traded 
futures on long-term interest rates. The growth of such contracts has been strongest 
67 Ibid. 
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where the underlying cash market seems most deficient in liquidity. In absolute terms, 
the fastest growing such liquidity in terms of turnover have been the futures on the 
French government bond and those on the German bund. In relative terms, the ratio 
of futures turnover to cash markets and lowest for the US market. (Figure 18) 
Figure 18 
Ratio of Futures to Cash Transactions 
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Combining the bond market issue we have just mentioned and the corporate 
leverage issue mentioned earlier, it is logical to conclude that : I f we want to have a 
picture on how the IRD market in Asia will look like, we must take a look at the 
development of the Asia debt market. I f the latter is going to develop, the former will 
definitely have a prosperous future. 
For the establishment of any market, demand and supply must exist 
coincidentally. Nothing will happen in the absence of either. It is apparent that the 
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demand for long term capital is huge. According to the World Bank's Report 1994, 
developing countries invest USD200 billion a year in new infrastructure. The Asian 
Development Bank suggests that USD1 triliion will be required between now and the 
end of the decade. Indeed, they are essential for the healthy growth of these 
developing countries. Good infrastructure raises productivity, lower production costs 
and improves living standards. Infrastructure capacity grows in step with economic 
output. A 1 percent increase in the stock of infrastructure is associated with a 1 
percent increase in GDP across all c o u n t r i e s . 6 8 
At the same time, here are a number of sources supplying funds. Traditionally, 
international commercial banks used to be the major sources of funding. However, 
recently, as the US benchmark long term interest rate edging downward, the yield 
hunger institutional investors in US are looking for high yield emerging market papers. 
This open the door for capital market financing of Asia infrastructure projects. In 
addition, a new source of funds has been mushrooming - equity funds aimed 
specifically at taking up stakes in projects in emerging markets. At least three have 
been set up: a USD2.5 billion established by GE Capital and George Soros; a USD1 
billion AIG Asian Infrastructure Fund and a USD1 billion Asian Infrastructure Fund 
from Peregrine Investments H o l d i n g s . 6 9 
68 "Private Financing to Double,” IFR World Bank Report, 1994. 
69 "Insatiable Appetite for Capital," IFR Asian Development Bank Report, 1994. 
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It seems that every thing is all right. There is demand and fundings are quickly 
available to Asia borrowers in a short period o f time from US or Europe. Then，what 
is the point to have an Asia debt market? 
The major questions leading to the development o f Asia debt market are: Is it 
possible to rely on foreign fundings for the coming ten or twenty years to finance Asia 
projects? What i f the investment environment of US and Europe are getting better? 
What i f foreign investors lose interest in Asia? Corporations in need of capital are 
finding that foreign investors' recently diminished interest in Asia is both dampening 
local stock markets and raising the cost of funding abroad. Therefore, local currency 
bond issues suddenly look attractive despite high local interest rates relative to those in 
the West because of the relatively high inflation rate in Asia developing countries. 
Borrowers with their revenue in local currencies trying to avoid interest rate risk 
(which may not be in tandem with the local economic development) and foreign 
exchange risks are the added catalysts to accelerate the formation ofAsia debt market. 
I f we take a look at the fund supply, Asia is flushed with money. In his book 
Asia Rising70, Jim Rohwer points out that Asia's high saving rates, combined with 
some of the world's lowest effective tax rates, are creating an extraordinarily deep pool 
of l iquid capital. This makes Asia probably the world's most-sought after market for 
private bankers. The Boston Consulting Group reckons that Hong Kong, with a per 
capita GDP equal to only about three quarters that of the US, has the world's second-
70 Rohwer, Jim, Asia Rising, Bultenvorlh-Heinemann Asia, 1995. 
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highest density o f millionaires: about 30,000 - 35,000 in a population o f 6 million. 
Thailand had some more than 20,000, Malaysia and Taiwan some 15,000 each; the 
Philippines and Indonesia with 10,000 - 12,000 each and Singapore with 5,000 in 3 
million population. It is no surprise that Hong Kong's two biggest private bankers -
Wadley and Citibank each had $10 billion o f private-banking assets under 
management in 1993. In the same year, Asian outside Japan saved $650 billion, 
compared with savings of $900 billion by Americans and $1.2 trill ion by Japanese. 
The difference between Japan and the rest of Asia, on one side, and America, on the 
other, is that whereas the Americans have probably the world's most sophisticated and 
transparent mechanism for transmitting savings to investments, Asians in general have 
a creaky mechanism that was originally designed to serve government policies rather 
than respond to market signals. 
It seems that the demand and supply are ready for the smooth development of 
the Asia bond market. However, Asian bond market remain a mystery by their 
absence, with equity market matures well before the bond market. It sounds 
unreasonable because, according to the Myer's (1984)7i pecking order theory for 
capital structure, firms are said to prefer retained earnings (available liquid assets) as � 
their main source of funds for investment. Next in the order to preference is debt, and 
last comes external equity f i n a n c i n g . 7 2 In addition, as we have mentioned earlier in 
this section, in the presence of tax benefit, bankruptcy cost and agency cost, it makes 
71 Myer, S.C., "The Capital Structure Puzzle," Journal ofFinance, July 1984, 575-592. 
72 Copeland T.E. and Weston J.F., Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Third edition, Addison-
Wesley, 1988. 
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sense for corporations to issue debt for project financing. Then what's wrong with 
Asia bond market? In a recent study, Ajit Singh, an economist at Cambridge 
University, reckons firms in emerging markets behave quite differently. According to 
the study, it is found that large corporations in emerging markets obtain one third of 
their funding through internal finance while the comparative figures for America and 
Germany are 77 percent and 67 percent respectively. This is not suprising because 
firms in emerging markets are young and fast-growing and their investment demand far 
outstrips internal resources. However, these corporations on average used twice as 
much equity as long-term debt. Why do their behaviour so different from their 
counterparts in developed industrial countries? 
It is unlikely that developing countries have inherently different needs. 
Admittedly, in early stages of America's industrialisation, firms issued a lot of equity. 
But that was mainly to finance mergers; in the countries studied by Mr. Singh, 
takeover were rare. Nor does family ownership, which is more common in emerging 
markets, seemed to be the explanation. In principle, family-owned firms should prefer 
to borrow if they do not want to dilute existing equity stakes. A more likely cause is 
government policy, which in many countries has favoured equity over debt finance. In 
some instances, this has been a by-product of privatisation: some governments have 
tried to encourage their citizens to become shareholders. But more direct means have 
also been used to promote equity at the expense ofdebt. 
Turkish companies, for example pay a lower corporate-tax rate i f enough of 
their shares are publicly traded. During the 1980s, the South Korean finance ministry 
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imposed an informal ceiling on debt-equity ratios. Recently, it has made a new rule 
which, in effect, forces firms to use equity or internal funds to pay for overseas 
projects. Even in India, where companies rely less on equity finance than in most 
emerging markets, the government gives expatriate Indians incentives to buy shares. 
What aggravate the situation are the history of high inflation and the lax bankruptcy 
laws that discourage creditors, making debt costlier^^. 
By the end of 1994 there were around $17 trillion worth ofbonds outstanding 
in the world. Of these bonds, mere 2 percent had been issued in Asia. And of $1.6 
trillion worth ofbonds issued worldwide in 1993, only about 1 percent were issued in 
Asia. This suggest that Asia is either on the edge of one of the biggest bond binges in 
history or that is going to avoid bondage altogether?+ 
To unleash this huge fixed income market potential in Asia, a lot of works need 
to be done: for example, to built up an efficient mechanism to transmit funds from the 
hand of individual depositors to institutional borrowers; to educate investors what 
bonds are; to have committed financial institutions to make the market; to have 
committed government to lead the development of local bond markets and set up 
benchmark for the market, etc. 
73 "That's the Way the Money Comes,” The Economist, November 11, 1995. 
74 Rohwer, Jim, Asia Rising. Butlervvorlh-Heineinann Asia, 1995. 
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Particularly, for Asia bond boom to come off, the first need is for ratings from 
reliable credit agencies. This is very new in Asia. Japan's first independent credit-
rating agency, Mikuni & Co, was set up only in the mid-1980s, and India got two 
independent agencies only in the late 1980s. Even so, the habit is spreading, in the 
early 1990s, Indonesia and Thailand as well as Malaysia set up credit-rating agencies 
and started requiring companies to get a rating before they issued debt. To get even 
this far requires a change in the culture at many Asian companies: They have to be 
more willing than in the past to disclose information about their business i f they are to 
be rated accurately. 
Secondly, governments must also start behaving differently. With a couple of 
exceptions, Asia's governments have rarely seen the need to borrow by issuing bonds. 
That may be praiseworthy from a fiscal point of view, but it causes a technical problem 
for the smooth development of a bond market. Investors normally benchmark the 
corparate bonds to the respective government papers. Without a government 
benchmark, the process of evaluating other bonds becomes much harder. Moreover, 
Asian governments must be less bossy about movements of capital across their 
borders. Otherwise, institutional investors will be threatened away. 
Thirdly, a liquid secondary market must be developed to facilitate smooth ofF-
load of investments. There is no point to invest in securities, though offering 
exceptional yield but has a large discount off its nominal value when they need to be 
off-loaded. The demand for a liquid secondary market can be translated into a demand 
for a stable investment environment which further implies 
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• Stable currency; 
• Sound economic and monetary policies to promote economic development 
and, at the same time, keep inflation under control; and 
• Stable political environment. 
Thailand is a good example of how sensible economic policy and stable 
investment environment can bring life to a bond market. It is carrying out Asia's most 
comprehensive program of financial liberalization and modernization and is likely to 
have the continent's best developed bond market by the end of the 1990s, mentioned 
by Jim Rohwer in his book Asia Rising. Thai companies were allowed to begin issuing 
debt only in 1992; but the next year, new issues of bonds in Thailand were 
considerably larger than new issues of equities. In 1994 secondary trading began on 
an exchange in Bangkok. The market started slowly, but both turnover and 
capitalization are expected to increase quickly. Thai companies have grown tired of 
expensive bank loans and equity-issuing exercises; infrastructure spending is shooting 
up and needs a new source of finance; and foreign investors, reassured by the stability 
of the Thai currency, its free convertibility to other currencies, and the managerial 
、 skills of the central bank, are likely to be eager to buy a piece of some of the fastest 
economic growth in Southeast Asia. Thailand's big banks are also backing the 
development of the bond market, setting up bond-underwriting and bond-trading 
subsidiaries to recapture some of the corporate clients that have been drifting away 
from commercial-bank loans. The success experience of Thailand does have positive 
impact on the development of the bond market in Asia. With Thailand's deregulation 
and liberalizing so quickly, the pressure will be on other Southeast Asian markets 
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(particularly Malaysia's and Indonesia's) to follow suit i f they want to keep up in the 
competition for international flows of debt capital. 
Within Asia, a systematic intermediation system is needed to unleash the 
wealth of local riches and savings of the labour forces with increasing salaries. 
Different pensions and insurance companies are setting up their offices in Asia to push 
the development. The formation of compulsory pension funds in different countries 
also help bring the intermediation process forward. In addition, recently in Hong 
Kong, the financial secretary, Mr. Donald Tsang, proposed a tax concession scheme to 
promote the fixed income businesses within the territory in his first financial budget for 
Hong Kong. Shortly after the proposal, the director of Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority, Mr. Joesph Yam, also propose the establishment of an association similar 
to FNMC of US to issue mortgage-backed-securities to help fund the expected 
mortgage need in the next decade. These actions have a positive signal to institutional 
investors that Hong Kong government is dedicate to take a leading role in developing 
the Asia bond market. 
It is also seen that different governments in Asia are willing to cooperate in 
order to boost a stable economic and investment environment which is an essential 
nourishment to a healthy growth of the Asia bond market. In 1995, the central banks 
of Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and China coming late in 1996 
signed repurchase agreements, signifying the dedication of governments of different 
Asia countries to create stable currencies for their countries through cooperation with 
other Asian counterparts. Furthermore, i f Japan's participation, which is under 
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negotiation, can be realized, the force to defense the Asia currencies wil l be much 
stronger because of Japan's substaintial holding o fUS T-bonds. 
So much so for the optimism, it is the time to mention some potential road 
blocks in the smooth development of Asia bond market. The swelling current account 
deficits ofmany Asian countries have already been a major concern of many investors. 
Although massive dumping of Asian stock leaded by this issue is unlikely for the time 
being, investors are worrying about it. 
According to an article in Asian Wall Street Journal, April 1，1996, "... True, 
the wave ofoverseas liquidity that has swept into Southeast Asia since late November 
has eased concerns that countries in the region could face difficulties funding their 
current-account deficits, Mr McDonnell says. But i f anything happens to reverse that 
capital inflow, problems could surface quickly, he warns. ... The crux o f the problem, 
say fund managers and analysts, is that many countries in the region try to peg their 
currencies to the US dollar. That hamstrings monetary policy, because raising interest 
rates to cool the economy could prompt a huge inflow of foreign money by investors 
who can tap into higher interest rates without fear of an offsetting devaluation in the 
currency. Such inflows can boost liquidity and thwart the central bank's aim of 
slowing the economy. The best hope for the region is that governments will take steps 
to slow their economies through fiscal austerity, analysts say. But they see few signs 
of aggressive action on that front. ... Kleinwort Benson's Mr. Peyman says that in 
Indonesia, a high proportion of capital-goods imports are used for goods intended for 
domestic consumption, rather than exports. That makes him less confident about 
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Indonesia than he is about Malaysia." Therefore, a cautious economic and monetary 
policy must be sought to keep the country from getting overheated. 
Finally, the stability of the political environment is crucial since a turbulent 
environment can discourage investors from putting their money in the region. 
Recently, disputes between China and Taiwan as well as that between North Korea 
and South Korea are indications of the power imbalance within Asia. I f the power 
imbalance cannot be settled smoothly, wars are the likely results. 
In conclusion, the prospect of Asia bond market is cautiously optimistic. Does 
this mean that the future development of IRDs in Asia Pacific region is going to be 
successful as well? Now we are going to see the opinions of market practitioners to 




Despite the close scrutiny of regulators and law-makers, despite the lawsuits 
over multi-million-dollar losses, banks and securities firms are as bullish as ever on 
derivatives. Credit Lyonnais USA is expanding it US based derivatives staffby 50%. 
Citibank and Chase report their derivatives volumes, largely driven by corporations 
rather than investors are up over 1993's. The derivatives staff at CIBC Wood Gundy 
is now at about 60 professional up from at the end o f l993 . Bear Stern, Smith Barney 
and Nomura have already had concrete plan to expand into the interest rate derivatives 
business in the year to c o m e . 7 5 
In a roundtable discussion between market makers, regulators, derivatives 
advisors and end users of derivatives, the consensus is that the recent financial 
derivative debacles have a positive impact on the industry's development. “……Those 
losses do have important implications, however. For dealers, the lessons are know 
your customers and only sell them what they really need. You should have a checklist 
of questions to ask end-users before they sell you any leveraged derivatives. For the 
majority of end-users, the lessons are equally straightforward: don't speculate, and 
understand what you are doing .•…” says Charles Taylor, the Executive Director of 
The Group ofThirty in the discussion. 
75 "Banks are Bullish on Derivatives," Global Finance. November 1994. 
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According to Craig H. Schiffer, Managing Director, Equity Derivatives, 
Lehman Brothers, it is wrong to single out the losses in the derivatives markets as 
being somehow different in kind from any market loss. This observation is borne out 
by what we've seen across all financial markets. There have been losses of 
significantly greater magnitude on an aggregate basis in both the straight debt and 
equity markets than in derivatives. The spotlight has focused on derivatives because 
the marketplace is still relatively young and has grown at such a rapid pace. The 
publicity around derivatives will have a positive long-term effect in that it ensures that 
end-users will be better educated. This view is confirmed by Gary P. Johnson, 
Managing Director, Risk management, Scudder, Steven & Clark, Inc., who says that 
"The first thing that spring to my mind is that, although there have been a few highly 
publicized large losses in the derivatives market, these products are in fact used quite 
successfully today by a large number of companies and portfolio managers. Let's call 
that activity the 'silent majority.' So, it's clear that disasters are not endemic to the 
industry; quite the opposite holds true .... Indeed, the big losses that have been 
publicized have not led to credit problems within the system. In general, participants 
understand what their credit risks are and what their overall exposures are to 
counterparties, and are managing them appropriately." 
The exposure of financial derivatives in the recent years is described by James 
M. Garnett, Jr, Senior Vice President, Global Risk Management, Chase Manhattan 
Bank, as positive and beneficial. “ I think the attention that derivatives have received 
over the last two years has been now fully involved, aware and taking concrete steps 
to improve the tone of the marketplace as a whole ，，says James. 
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Finally, at the end of the roundtable discussion, Charles Taylor, the Executive 
Director ofThe Group ofThir ty , concluded that there would be four trends: 
(1) A continuing focus on improving risk management, the G30 survey published 
last December showed that concern about risk management is wide-spread and 
that many dealers and end-users plan increased investment in risk management 
in this year. 
(2) The growth and development of derivative activity will continue. Emerging 
market will show a strong growth in this area because they are bound to be 
volatile for a good many years and derivatives are bound to be useful in these 
areas. 
(3) Fairly strong growth in use in the industrial countries should resume after the 
full implications of the recent losses have been absorbed. 
(4) Innovation is going to continue as well. Although the growth of exotics has 
suffered, the fact remains that there are complex risks intrinsic to many end-
user businesses and the demand for risk management instruments to control 
those risks will continue to grow as we increase our understanding7^ 
Their views are confirmed by the trading volumes ofIRDs. According to mid-
year estimates complied by 61 dealer members of the ISDA, outstanding notional 
principal in interest rate swaps, currency swaps, caps, collars, floors and swaptions 
reached $13,923 trillion for the first six months of 1995, compared with $11,303 
76 "Derivatives: Lessons Learned," Risk Eview 1994 / Preview 1995, January 1995. 
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trillion at year-end 1994. Interest rate swaps outstanding for the first six months of 
1995 climbed to $10.8 trillion in notional principal, up 22.7 percent from $8.8 trillion 
at the close of 1994. New interest rate futures written during the same time period 
grew by 12.1 percent to $3,429 trillion from $3,058 trillion in the preceding six 
months. Outstanding interest rate options - caps, collars, floors, and swaptions -
expanded by 331.4 percent to $2,066 trillion from $1,573 trillion at the end of last 
y e a r . 7 7 
Though trading volume increased, the attitude towards derivatives were 
different. In the past, corporate treasurers saw complex structured products as 
innovation. Nowadays, these products are viewed as complication. Mike 
Christienson, director of fixed income structured products at Swiss Bank Corporation 
in London says, ".... people spend a lot more time thinking about it and put on trades 
which are a lot more appropriate .... We wouldn't be here i f we didn't think these 
volumes were going to come b a c k . , " 8 
The real economic benefits brought about by Interest Rate Derivatives together 
with Asia's turbulent financial environment as well as the optimistic development of 
Asia bond market, it is expected that the pace of future development ofIRDs in Asia is 
accelerating. However, it is very likely that the derivatives invasion of Asia can only 
continue to expand, hand in hand with the growing prosperity of the region. Asian 
customers' use of derivatives can only increase as they become more sophisticated. 
77 "The Simpler, The Better," Risk Review 1995 / Preview 1996, January 1996. 
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The complexity and range of derivatives can only continue to multiply, as Asian 
countries deregulate their financial systems and more exchanges list derivatives 
contracts7^ 
79 “Derivatives Invade Asia,” IFR Asian Development Bank Report, 1994. 
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF SOME DsfTEREST RATE SWAP PRODUCTS 
Fixed/floating interest rate swap 
One counterparty provides provide floating rate interest payments in exchange 
of fixed rate payments, effectively converting an existing fixed rate obligation 
into a floating rate obligation, or vice verse. 
OfF-market swap 
Any swap set up with a nonzero initial value is "ofF market," and at some point 
a compensating up-front payment from one party to the other or a lower-than-
market coupon will be required to bring the net value to zero. 
Zero-coupon swap 
A zero-coupon swap is an extreme case of an off-market swap, in which one of 
the counterparties makes a lump-sum payment instead of periodic payments 
over time. 
Basis swap 
A basis swap is a swap between two floating-rate indexes. An example is when 
LIBOR interest payments are swapped against interest payments based on the 
CP index on the same notional amount. 
Asset swaps and synthetic securities 
Swaps are used not only for managing liabilities but also for engineering cash 
flows from assets into desired formats. For example, a floating-rate asset can 
be converted into a synthetic fixed-rate asset using an interest rate swap. 
Forward swap 
A forward swap is one in which there is a delay between the date on which the 
swap is traded or committed to and the settlement or effective date of the 
swap. It is like a forward contract to enter into a swap. 
Currency interest rate swap 
In a currency swap, one party agrees to make periodic payments in one 
currency to a counterparty, which in turn makes periodic payments to the other 
in a different currency. 
Source: Sundaram, Anant, "International Financial Markets," Handbook of 
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